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Australia, in particular the administrations applicable to individual debtors. Next, it briefly describes
current Australian scholarship on consumer bankruptcy, before outlining pertinent bankruptcy and
consumer credit regulation. Suggestions to decrease consumer bankruptcy numbers include extension of
the "cooling-off period" for those intending to petition voluntarily, encouragement to consumers to enter
debt agreements with creditors, and better use of the Consumer Credit Code remedies.
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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES: AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE©
BY ROSALIND MASON*

Over the past three decades, Australia has experienced
a significant increase in the number of consumer
bankruptcies. Until the early 1970s, the number of
business and consumer bankruptcies was approximately
equal, whereas in 1997 to 1998, for every businessrelated bankruptcy, there were approximately four
consumer bankruptcies. This article gives a concise
overview of insolvency laws in Australia, in particular
the administrations applicable to individual debtors.
Next, it briefly describes current Australian scholarship
on consumer bankruptcy, before outlining pertinent
bankruptcy and consumer credit regulation.
Suggestions to decrease consumer bankruptcy numbers
include extension of the "cooling-off period" for those
intending to petition voluntarily, encouragement to
consumers to enter debt agreements with creditors, and
better use of the Consumer CreditCode remedies.

Pendant les trois derniers d6cennies, I'Australie a
connu une grande augmentation dans le nombre de
faillite des consommateurs. Jusqu'au debut des ann6es
1970, le nombre de faillites de consommateurs et
d'entreprises 6tait Apeu pros 6gal, tandis qu'en 1997 et
1998, pour toute faillite d'entreprise, il y avait
approximativement quatre faillites de consommateurs.
Cet article donne un survol concis des lois de
l'insolvabilit6 en Australie, plus particuli~rement des
administrations relatives aux individus d6biteurs.
Ensuite, il d~crit bri~vement les recherches actuelles en
Australie sur la faillite, avant de donner un aperu du
r~glement concemant la faillite et le cr6dit. De parmi
les suggestions pour diminuer le nombre de faillites de
consommateurs sont 'extension de la dur6e de «the
cooling-off period)> pour ceux qui veulent p6titionner
volontairement, l'encouragement des consommateurs
de conclure des accords de dettes avec les cr6anciers, et
un meilleurs usage des remdes du Code de credit des
consommateurs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the stock market crash of the late 1980s and the
subsequent notorious financial collapses of well-known corporate groups
such as Bond, Qintex, and Lintner, insolvency law gained some rare
publicity in the Australian press. With the simultaneous financial demise
of many of the entrepreneurs who had founded corporate empires, such
as Alan Bond, Christopher Skase, and Abe Goldberg, personal
insolvency or bankruptcy law also captured the public (and political)
interest. So much so, that the proposed changes to the bankruptcy
legislation in 1992 (designed to curtail "high flyers"1) were popularly
called the "Skase amendments" as they nearly coincided with
Christopher Skase's departure from Australia.
Yet the reality is that the majority of bankrupts in Australia do
not fit the description of former corporate high flyers enjoying lifestyles
of undiminished splendour.2 A 1998 study by the Insolvency and Trustee
Service Australia (ITsA) into the socio-economic situation of those who
became bankrupt during 1997 revealed that the profile of a "typical
bankrupt" was male, single (including a single parent), under 40 years of
age, unemployed, owed creditors approximately A$14,150, had a prebankruptcy annual income of A$13,400 (which dropped to A$10,600

I The changes included an income contribution scheme for undischarged bankrupts and
revised the grounds for objecting to an automatic discharge.
2 See Bond v. The Trustee of the Property of Bond (1994), 125 A.L.R. 399 at 414 (F.C.A.),
French J.

[hereinafter Bond]. See also M.

Murray, "Lifestyles

of Undiminished

Splendour-Bankrupts on Fringe Benefits" (1994) 6:4 J. Insolv. Prac. Assoc. Austl. 6.
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after becoming bankrupt), and who also had an 8 per cent chance of
being a previous bankrupt. 3
This and other data compiled by the ITSA, as well as research
being undertaken by others-including the national finance industry
association, the Australian Finance Conference (AFC), 4 and the Centre
for Australian Financial InstitutionsS-is contributing to a better
understanding of the Australian dimension of the problem of consumer
bankruptcy.
This article gives a concise overview of the regulation of
insolvency in Australia and, in particular, the insolvency administrations
available for individuals who are unable to meet their debts as they fall
due. It then briefly describes current scholarship on consumer
bankruptcy, and finally, outlines aspects of bankruptcy and consumer
credit regulation relevant to the topic.
II. AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCY LAW
Australian law distinguishes between the insolvency of personal
and corporate debtors. Under the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, the federal Parliament has power to make laws with
respect to "bankruptcy and insolvency." 6 The laws dealing with personal
bankruptcies and alternative arrangements with creditors are found in
the Bankruptcy Act. 7 Corporate insolvencies are regulated by the
Corporations Law8 which, while nationally uniform, is for constitutional
reasons enacted through state and territory legislation. 9 However, in
3 See Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Profiles of Debtors Who Became Bankrupt or
Entered into Debt Agreements in 1997 (Canberra: Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, 1998) at
19.
4 See S. Edwards, "Consumer Bankruptcy: A Finance Industry Perspective" New Directionsin
Bankruptcy (May 1998) 16 [hereinafter "A Finance Industry Perspective"]; and S. Edwards,
"Lending Money and Getting It Back" (Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Second National
Bankruptcy Congress, Melbourne, 5 November 1998) [unpublished].
5 See J. Kumar, R. Mason & D. Ralston, "Consumer Bankruptcies: Causes and Implications
for the Credit Industry" (1998) 17:3 Econ. Papers 18.
6 See Commonwealth ofAustralia ConstitutionAct, s. 51(xvii) [hereinafter ConstitutionAct].
71966 (Cth) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act].
8 See CorporationsAct, 1989 (Cth), s. 82 ("The Corporations Law") [references to section 82
of this Act will hereinafter be referred to as the "Corporations Law"].
9 The Commonwealth's power to enact corporations legislation under section 51(xx) of the
Constitution Act, supra note 6, applies to "[f]oreign corporations, and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth." In New South Wales v. The
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practice the laws operate as a national scheme and are regulated by the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission.1 0 While various law
reform bodies and committees of review have pondered a merged
regulatory framework for personal and corporate insolvencies,11 there is
no indication at present that the policymakers intend to change the
current regime. 12
III. PERSONAL INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATIONS
A number of options are available to a person who is insolvent
and unable to pay his or her debts as they come due. 13 In addition to
informal action taken outside the regulatory framework, debtors may
either have their estates administered in bankruptcy, or enter into
binding arrangements with creditors to satisfy their debts in part or in
full. A person may become bankrupt voluntarily upon his or her own
petition, or involuntarily upon a creditor's petition.
Commonwealth (1990), 169 C.L.R. 482 (H.C.A.), the High Court of Australia held that this section
did not allow the Commonwealth to make laws for the incorporation of trading or financial
corporations as opposed to making laws to regulate their subsequent activities. The Corporations
LegislationAmendment Act, 1990 (Cth) made the Corporations Law, supra note 8, applicable to the
Australian Capital Territory under the Commonwealth's general authority to make laws for the
territories: see ConstitutionAct, supra note 6, s. 122. Each State and the Northern Territory has since
passed corporations legislation that the Corporations Law, as in force for the time being, is to apply
in their respective jurisdictions: see Corporations (New South Wales) Act, 1990 (N.S.W.);
Corporations(Victoria) Act, 1990 (Vic.); Corporations(Queensland)Act, 1990 (Qld.); Corporations
(South Australia)Act, 1990 (S.A.); Corporations(Western Australia) Act, 1990 (W.A.); Corporations
(Tasmania)Act, 1990 (Tas.); and Corporations(NorthernTerritory)Act, 1990 (N.T.).
10 The scheme does have "technical" implications. For example, in Re Wakim (1999), 163
A.L.R. 270 (H.C.A.), the High Court of Australia held that a cross-vesting of jurisdiction scheme
which purported to vest state jurisdiction in federal courts was invalid. The Federal Court of
Australia's company law jurisdiction is now severely limited. Previously, parties freely chose
between the State and Territory Supreme Courts and the Federal Court when initiating civil
proceedings under the Corporations Law.
11 See Australia, Law Reform Commission, GeneralInsolvency Inquiry (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service 1988) at para.. 933 [hereinafter GeneralInsolvency Inquiry]; Trade
Practices Commission, Study of the Professions: FinalReport (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1992) at 73 (Accountancy); and Working Party, Review of the Regulation of
CorporateInsolvency Practitioners(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997) at
66-69.
12 On a practical level, this division means that different government bodies regulate personal
and corporate insolvency administrations. Individuals fall under the Insolvency and Trustee Service
Australia (n'sA), while companies fall under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
Different government departments are responsible for policy and reform matters: personal
insolvency falls under the Attorney General's Department (SA), and corporate insolvency falls
under the Treasury.
13 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 52.
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' Personal insolvency administrations are conducted by both the
public and private sector. Bankruptcies may be administered by trustees
from either sector, although the vast majority are administered by the
public sector-in effect, the ITSA'S Official Receivers. In 1997-1998, of
the 24,408 new bankruptcies (voluntary and compulsory), 95 per cent
were administered by Official Receivers, 14 and 5 per cent by private
registered trustees. Recent legislative amendments permit formal
arrangements with creditors to be administered by Official Receivers as
well as by private registered trustees, although these are likely to remain
the domain of the private sector.15 Proposals for debt agreements by
low-income debtors are processed by the public sector, whereas the
administration of approved agreements may be administered either by
the public or private sector.
A. Sequestration
1. Debtor's petition
A debtor may become bankrupt voluntarily by presenting a
petition to an Official Receiver, together with a Statement of Affairs
16
containing personal details and details of assets, liabilities, and income.
If the documents are in the correct form, and no creditor's petition is
pending, the Official Receiver must accept the petition, and the person
becomes bankrupt on the day the petition is accepted.1 7 The Official
Receiver automatically becomes the trustee, unless the debtor
nominates a private registered trustee who has previously signed a
consent to act.
By far, the largest proportion of bankruptcies result from the
debtor's own petition. In the 1997-1998 financial year, 94 per cent of
14 The Official Trustee, a corporation sole with perpetual succession (see Bankruptcy Act,
supranote 7, s. 18) is the trustee of any estate for which no private registered trustee is appointed. In
practice, the Official Trustee acts through the Official Receivers, who conduct the administration of
estates for each bankruptcy district (state or territory).
15 See Australia, House of Representatives, Bankruptcy LegislationAmendment Bill 1996:
Explanatory Memorandum (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996) at para.
137.2 [hereinafterAmendmentBill Memorandum] which stated: "It is intended that the power of the
Official Trustee to accept authorities [to commence a formal Part X arrangement with creditors]
should be exercised only in very exceptional circumstances .... "
16
A debtor's petition may be presented by an individual, by a partnership, or by joint debtors:
see BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, ss. 55-57.
17Ibid. s. 55(4).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

37 NOS.

I

&2

bankruptcies resulted from debtors' petitions and 6 per cent from
creditors' petitions.18
2. Creditor's petition
Compulsory bankruptcy results from a creditor's petition
presented at a Federal Court Registry. The prerequisites are an act of
bankruptcy within the previous six months, a specific jurisdictional link
with Australia, and a liquidated sum of A$2,000 owing by the debtor to
the creditor.1 9 The most common act of bankruptcy relied upon is a
failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice. 2 0 In 1997-1998, 7,265
bankruptcy notices were issued, and there were only 1,664 petitions. 21
Initially, all creditors' petitions are heard by a Registrar
exercising delegated powers.2 2 At the hearing of the petition, the
creditor must prove the matters stated in the petition, the service of the
petition, and that the debt relied upon is still owing.23 Nevertheless, the
court has complete discretion in deciding whether or not to make a
sequestration order. While the High Court has referred to the public
interest in the cessation of unremunerative trading and the rights of
creditors whose debts are not paid, 24 courts will not make such orders
lightly, due to the drastic change in status that bankruptcy brings. 25

18 Each year the Inspector-General of Bankruptcy, who has the general administration of tile
Bankruptcy Act, is required to report to the relevant minister on the operation of the Act, a report

that includes much useful information on bankruptcy within Australia: see ibid. s. 12(l)(d). For
quarterly and annual statistics, see online: Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia
<http:/lIaw.gov.au/itsalframestatistics.html> (date accessed: 5 September 1999).
19 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, ss. 43-44.
20

1bid. s. 40(1)(g).

21 This number comprises petitions by both creditors and persons administering deceased

estates, although the latter are presumably small in number.
22 See Federal Court Rules, Order 77, Rule 7, online: Federal Court of Australia

<http:llwww.fedcourt.gov.au/order77.pdf> (date accessed: 9 September 1999). The potential
outcomes are adjournment, dismissal, withdrawal, or a sequestration order: see A. Keay, Insolvency.
Personaland CorporateLaw and Practice,3d ed. (Sydney: John Libbey & Co., 1998) at 51.

23 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 52.
24 See Rozenbes v. Kronhill (1956), 95 C.L.R. 407 at 414 (H.C.A.).

25 See Keay, supra note 22 at 52, citing Bowen C.J., and Sweeney and Burchett JJ., in Re: Neil
Robert Russell v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (1987), 14 F.C.R. 72 at 75
(F.C.A.).
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B. PartXArrangements
The Bankruptcy Act also provides for alternative arrangements
into which a debtor may enter with creditors so as to avoid bankruptcy. 26
Under Part X arrangements, a debtor who is insolvent signs a section
188 authority in favour of a trustee or solicitor 2 7 to take control of the
debtor's property, and to call a meeting of creditors at which a proposal
is made by the debtor.
Prior to the meeting, the controlling trustee sends the creditors a
report on the debtor's affairs; an opinion as to whether the creditors'
interests would be better served by either accepting the debtor's
proposal, if any, or by bankruptcy; and a statement about the possible
resolutions that may be passed at the meeting. 28 In order to achieve an
arrangement that is binding on all creditors with provable debts, the
proposed arrangement must be approved by special resolution, that is,
by a majority in number and at least 75 per cent in value of the creditors
29
voting at the meeting.
The options available under Part X are (1) a deed of assignment,
by which a debtor assigns all divisible property for the benefit of
creditors;3 0 (2) a composition pursuant to which creditors agree to
accept either repayment over time by instalments, or part payment in full
satisfaction; or (3) a deed of arrangement, which is an arrangement to
repay debts, whether in whole or in part, and which does not fall within
the other two categories. 3 '
From the debtor's point of view, arrangements have the
advantage of avoiding the stigma of bankruptcy, the cost of court
proceedings, and untoward publicity, as well as the limitations that are
placed on undischarged bankrupts. Except in a few situations, after26 For a discussion of non-statutory alternatives, such as private informal arrangements with
all creditors (potentially voidable under section 213 of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 7), see A.
Keay & P. Kennedy, "To Bankrupt, or Not to Bankrupt? The Question Faced by All Insolvency
Advisers: Part One" (1993) 1:4 Insolv. L.J. 187.
27 A registered liquidator or solicitor must sign a consent in writing or, if the Official Trustee
is to be appointed, the written approval of an Official Receiver to name the Official Trustee in the
authority must be obtained: see Bankruptcy Act, supra note 7, s. 188(2).
28
Ibid. ss. 189A-189B.
29

Ibid. s. 204.

30 Divisible property is property that, with the exception of property acquired on or after the
day the deed of assignment was executed, would be divisible amongst the debtor's creditors if he or
she had become bankrupt on that day: ibid. s. 187, "divisible property."
31 Ibid. ss. 187,204.
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acquired property is not affected, and the debtor is not required to make
contributions from income to creditors. Arrangements also tend to
minimize the extent to which the affairs of the debtor are examined, and
the debtor's exposure to criminal prosecution may be less. The
advantages for creditors include an independent controller of the
debtor's assets from the time the Part X procedure is initiated, and often
the creditors will receive a distribution sooner than they would in a
bankruptcy. 32
C. PartIX DebtAgreements
In 1996, a new form of administration was introduced with Part
IX debt agreements. Debt agreements are intended to be "a viable lowcost alternative to bankruptcy for low-income debtors with little or no
property, with few creditors, and with low levels of liability, for whom
entry into a Part X administration is not possible because of inability to
meet set up costs."33 To be eligible, a debtor must have limited assets
and liabilities (less than A$54,254.20), and an annual after-tax income of
less than A$27,127.10.34
Under the Part IX procedure, the debtor submits a proposal and
a Statement of Affairs to the Official Trustee (in effect, the ITSA), who
determines whether the debtor meets the eligibility requirements under
Part IX.35 The ITSA then advises the creditors of the proposal, provides a
summary of the debtor's statement of affairs, and allows the creditors to
vote on it either at a meeting or by post. 36 While the proposal is being
processed, a moratorium applies to creditors proceeding against the
debtor in respect of frozen debts.3 7 The debt agreement becomes

32 For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of arrangements for debtors and
creditors, see Keay, supranote 22 at 164-66.
33

Amendment Bill Memorandum, supra note 15 at para. 135.16.

34 These sums are linked to Base Income Threshold Amount (i.e., seven times the basic rate of

the partnered pension under the Social Security Act, 1991 (Cth)). For the latest indexed figures, see
online: Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia <http://law.gov.aufitsa/frame-curr.html> (date
accessed: 5 September 1999). A debtor is disqualified from eligibility for a debt agreement where,
during the past ten years, he or she has been a bankrupt, a debtor under a debt agreement, or has
signed an authority under section 188 of the BankruptcyAct, supra note 7.
35 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, ss. 185C-185E.
36 Ibid.

37 Ibid. s. 185F. This does not apply to debts arising under a maintenance agreement or
maintenance order: ibid. s. 185.
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effective when the proposal is accepted by a majority and at least 75 per
cent (in value) of the creditors voting before the deadline. 38 The
agreement remains in force until it ends, is varied, or is terminated. 39
Due to the restricted eligibility criteria, the creditors are likely to
receive very little, if anything, through bankruptcy, and there is the
potential for creditors to receive more funds because the agreements are
set up by the ITSA. However, creditors may have difficulty in making an
informed decision on the proposal because they may feel that the debtor
has not disclosed all of his or her assets. Also, where the debtor proposes
to make small payments or payments over a long period of time,
processing the payments may be more costly to a creditor than simply
writing the debt off.40
IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Information on bankruptcy in Australia can be obtained from
the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy's annual report to Parliament on
the operation of the BankruptcyAct, and from the ITSA, which maintains
the National Personal Insolvency Index. This is an index of all
proceedings which have occurred under the Bankruptcy Act and its
predecessors.
The following statistical information is based on the 1997-1998
Annual Report.41 In 1997-1998, there were a total of 24,408
bankruptcies-an 11.8 per cent increase on the previous year.42 Of these,
4,854 (19.9 per cent) were business-related, and 19,554 (80.1 per cent)
were non-business bankruptcies.
The distinction between business and non-business bankruptcies
depends upon whether or not an individual's occupation and cause of
bankruptcy are related to any proprietary interest in a business or
38 The deadline is generally the twenty-fifth working day after acceptance of the proposal for
processing: ibid. s. 185(2).
39

Ibid. ss. 185A-185B.

40 See K. Smith, "Debt Agreements-A New Alternative for Debtors" New Directions in
Bankruptcy (July 1997) 21. Other weaknesses that have been identified with the regime are the low
qualifying income threshold, the long period (ten years) for disqualifying prior insolvency
administrations, and the complicated variation and termination provisions.
41 See Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, Annual Report on the Operationof the Bankruptcy Act
1966 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1998) [hereinafter Annual Report].
42 There were also 349 debt agreements (a large increase from the previous financial year,
even taking into account the fact that they were first introduced in December 1996) and 427 Part X
arrangements (a 15.78 per cent increase on 1996-1997).
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company. This classification as business or non-business (or consumer)
bankruptcy is based upon the trustees' inquiries, including the
bankrupt's Statement of Affairs and the bankrupt's occupational status
prior to bankruptcy. Until 1972-1973, the number of business and
consumer bankruptcies was approximately equal. 43 In recent years, while
the number of business-related bankruptcies has remained relatively
steady, consumer bankruptcies have grown significantly. 44
These record levels of bankruptcy have occurred "despite an
expansionary economy and record low interest rates. While economic
factors such as unemployment have contributed to rising bankruptcy
rates, lenders and mortgage insurers have noted an increasing tendency
for borrowers to seek early bankruptcy rather than resolve problems
with lender institutions." 45
Research in other jurisdictions, which highlights a strong
correlation between the number of consumer bankruptcies and the
growth in the volume of consumer credit, is supported by Australian
statistics. 4 6 A further statistical correlation between the number of
consumer bankruptcies and unemployment rates is supported by the
soaring unemployment rates in Australia in 1991-1992. However, the
current trend of increasing bankruptcies, despite a lower unemployment
rate, suggests that factors apart from unemployment rates are
responsible for the rise. 47
As far as the causes of consumer bankruptcies are concerned,
there is a dearth of research evidence. In the late 1980s, a study was
undertaken in Melbourne utilizing interviews with a sample of
undischarged, voluntary consumer bankrupts. The study established a
link between creditor harassment and the decision by over-committed
debtors to petition for their own bankruptcies. 48

43 See M. Ryan, "Consumer Bankrupts in Melbourne" (1993) 28 Austl. J. Soc. Issues 34 at 35
[hereinafter "Consumer Bankrupts in Melbourne"].
44 See Appendix, Figure 1, below.
45 Kumar, Mason & Ralston, supra note 5, citing Council of Financial Supervisors, Annual
Report (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 1998) at 22.
46 See Appendix, Figure 2, below.

47 See Kumar, Mason & Ralston, supra note 5 at 20.
48 See M. Ryan, The Last Resort: An EmpiricalStudy of Non-Business, Voluntary, Undischarged
Bankrupts in Melbourne, Australia (Ph.D. Thesis, La Trobe University, 1989) [unpublished]. Most
respondents (60 per cent) were not employed at the time of their bankruptcy; indeed for 70 per cent

of the unemployed debtors, insolvency had come about while they were in receipt of welfare
payments on a long-term basis: see "Consumer Bankrupts in Melbourne," supra note 43 at 43-44.
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In June 1998, allegations of harassment resulted in the

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission announcing a
research project on section 60 of the Trade PracticesAct49 offences.SO

Section 60 prohibits the use of physical force or undue harassment 1 or
coercion5 2 in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or

services, or payment for goods or services.53
Some general information on the causes of bankruptcy is
contained in the Inspector-General of Bankruptcy's Annual Report.S4
However, these causes are self-attributed, and are classified and
categorized from information provided by the bankrupts themselves. For
1997-1998, the five major causes identified by bankrupts as reported by
trustees are as follows:55

49 1974 (Cth).
50 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Undue Harassment and Coercion
in Debt Collection (Canberra: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 1999), online:
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission <http:llwww.accc.gov.auldocs/catalog.htm>
(date accessed: 4 September 1999).
51 Harassment is conduct that causes distress, agitation, anxiety, or worry to the recipient;
interferes with the recipient's peace and quiet; and/or amounts to pestering or plaguing with
repeated requests or demands. It is undue when the conduct is either persistent or, if a one-off
occurrence, is excessive, improper, inappropriate, or unnecessary.
52 Coercion means a negation of choice that can be created by either physical means (e.g.,
threats of violence) or non-physical means (e.g., threats to reputation or peace of mind). Coercion
occurs when unacceptable or illegitimate pressure is brought to bear on one party by another, such
pressure being a factor that persuades the victim to undertake a particular course of action.
53 Some non-exclusive examples cited are telephone communications between 9 p.m. and 8
a.m. (unless the trader has been advised by the recipient that calls within this time period, or a part
of this time period, are acceptable and convenient); telephone communications or visits at a
person's workplace, where the trader has been asked not to contact the person at work;
misrepresentation about the consequences of non-payment or of the debt recovery process;
disclosure of information, or threat of such disclosure, to third parties who do not have a clear and
legitimate interest in the information (e.g., employers, neighbours, welfare agencies, or government
agencies); contacting the consumer when asked to deal directly through an adviser (solicitor,
financial counsellor, etc.); and misrepresentation that the trader is a solicitor, is employed by a
solicitor, is an independent debt collector, is a bailiff, or is a police officer.
54

Supra note 41.

55 A study of official files of bankrupts and Part X debtors for the period 1976-1990 was
undertaken by Joan Carr to ascertain the social and ethnic backgrounds of debtors, as well as the
business characteristics and reasons behind failure. As she noted, a methodological problem was
that the officials dealing with bankruptcy petitioners and Part X debtors were involved in a labelling
process that was shaped by bureaucratic and legal constraints (Le., they categorize the responses
from bankrupts according to pre-set categories on an official form). Also, causality could not be
attributed to the eleven official factors because it was not known for certain that, where bankruptcy
did not occur, those factors were not present: see J. Carr, "Business Failure and Social Inequality"
(1994) 29 Austl. J. Soc. Issues 195 at 198.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL,

37

NOS.

1 &2

TABLE 1
MAJOR CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES IN AUSTRALIA
Business Bankruptcies*

MajorCauses

Economic conditions
Lack of business ability
Excessive interest
Lack of capital
Excessive drawings
Total

Per Cent

14.86
11.75
10.73
10.69
4.09
52.12

ConsumerBankruptcies

MajorCauses

Unemployment
Domestic discord
Excessive use of credit
I11 health
Adverse litigation

Per Cent

36.27
13.37
11.65
6.79
3.69
71.77

* A large percentage (39.1) of business bankruptcies were recorded in the Inspector-General in
Bankruptcy, Annual Report on the Operation of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Canberra: Australian

Government Publishing Service, 1998) at 44 as "other causes or causes not stated."

Other causes of bankruptcy that have been identified are
changing societal and ethical values; consumer awareness of bankruptcy
as an option to discharge debt; a competitive retail financial services
market using aggressive advertising; the availability of credit for young,
low-income consumers who have traditionally been a high-risk group;
and gambling.5 6 Gambling may be under-represented as a factor in the
official statistics, given that the factors are based on information
provided by the bankrupts. This is because it is an offence for a bankrupt
to have materially contributed to his or her insolvency, or increased its
extent, by gambling during the two years before presentation of the
petition. 57
V. REGULATORY DIMENSION TO
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES
Recently the AFC has referred to anecdotal evidence of a rise in
consumer bankruptcies as follows:
Feedback from member companies of the Australian Finance Conference (AFC) over
recent times has drawn attention to the trend for consumer bankruptcy to be initiated by
debtors rather than by creditors, involving relatively small amounts outstanding

56 See D. Ralston, "Bankruptcy and Credit Risk" (Yarran and Baxter 1998 Lending
Conference, Sydney, 7-8 May, 1998) [unpublished].
57 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 271(a).

1999]

An AustralianPerspective
(estimated average, $2,500) and frequently with little or no prior indication or warning of
financial difficulties. This avoidable outcome is of serious concern.58

Similar concerns about consumer bankruptcies were expressed in
submissions to the Australian Law Reform Commission's General
Insolvency InquiryS9 conducted in the late 1980s. In addressing the
question of whether alternatives should replace voluntary bankruptcies,
the Commission noted in its findings:
One criticism which was made ... was that it is "too easy" to become bankrupt. While, in
some cases, that may be a legitimate criticism, other submissions ... expressed the firm
view that voluntary bankruptcy serves an essential and largely humane purpose in the
present credit economy because in many cases it is the only realistic means to deal, in a

conclusive fashion, with the financial affairs of an insolvent person. There is compelling
evidence that many persons who become bankrupt have no assets and are either not in
receipt of income or not able to contribute anything from their income to their
creditors.60

A. DebtAgreements
The Australian Law Reform Commission concluded in the
General Insolvency Inquiry that there was a need in Australia to provide
an inexpensive and expeditious means for persons (particularly those in
receipt of sufficient regular income) to be able to make an agreement
with their creditors for a scheme of repayment. An amended form of the
recommended Debts Payment Plan61 has now been implemented in the
new Part IX of the BankruptcyAct.
Following the introduction of Part IX to the Act on 16 December
1996, 48 debt agreements were implemented prior to 30 June 1997. The
statistics for the 1997-1998 financial year show an increase to 349 debt
agreements. An interesting difference has emerged between districts. In
Western Australia and Tasmania, where members of the private sector
(i.e., registered trustees, financial advisers, and others) have assumed the
administration of approved agreements, there have been significant
increases in the number of debt agreements.

58 "A Finance Industry Perspective," supra note 4 at 16.
59

Supra note 11.

60

Ibid. at para. 424 [footnotes omitted].

61 Ibid. at para. 432.
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TABLE 2
PART IX DEBT AGREEMENTS
District

1996-1997

1997-1998

Per Cent Change

New South Wales

13

30

130.77

Australian Capital Territory
Victoria
Queensland
South Australia
Northern Territory
Western Australia
Tasmania
Total

3
3
7
3
0
18
1
48

7
15
27
14
0
152
104
349

133.33
400.00
285.71
366.67
0
744.44
n.a.
627.08

Source: Insolvency Trustee Service Australia, "Administrations Under the Bankruptcy Act 1966
Statistics (Provisional) Financial Year Ended 30 June 1998," online: Insolvency Trustee Service
Australia <http://law.gov.aufitsa/framestatistics.html> (date accessed: 4 September 1999).

Little additional information is available at this time on the
implementation of debt agreements. However, it appears that in
Western Australia, during 1997-1998, about 80 per cent of debt
agreements involved payments by instalment over 24-48 months, and the
average return promised by debtors was around 70 cents on the dollar
(Australian). Some 12 per cent of agreements were terminated through
the debtor's default, and it is anticipated that this percentage may rise
over time. 62
B. Education
The General Insolvency Inquiry also recommended that a

federally-funded public insolvency service be set up to provide basic
information and referral services. Its role would be to inform debtors
about the nature of the available legal alternatives, the procedures
involved, and their impact on the debtor.63

62 Telephone conversation with John Sherwood, Deputy Official Receiver, Perth, Western
Australia (12 August 1998).
63 See GeneralInsolvency Inquiry, supra note 11 at para. 475.
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On 3 January 1989, a pre-bankruptcy moratorium was
introduced to minimize the risks of mistaken and hasty bankruptcies. 64
Where a debtor has decided to present a voluntary petition, a limited
stay may be obtained against civil debt-recovery processes. 65 This
cooling-off period of seven days is intended to allow the debtor time to
consider alternative courses of action. Prior to accepting the declaration
of intention to present a petition, the Official Receiver must give the
debtor prescribed information on alternatives to, and consequences of,
bankruptcy. 66 The same information must also be given to the debtor
67
before the Official Receiver accepts a debtor's petition.
The AFc has stated that it would prefer this cooling-off period to
be extended to twenty-eight days, during which time "all affected
creditors can assess the debtor's circumstances and agree amongst
themselves and with the debtor on an outcome that serves best the
collective interests of all parties." 68 Debtors may also contact credit
counselling agencies for advice.69
C. Exempt Property
One of the possible factors influencing a debtor's decision to
enter into bankruptcy is the value of his or her assets that are exempt
from the estate administered.7 0 In Australia, property that is excluded
from divisible property is listed in section 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act,
with certain criteria amplified in subsequent subsections and in the
Bankruptcy Regulations. Exempt property includes the following:
Property held by the bankrupt in trust for another person.

1.

64 According to Emma Swart and Jenny Lawton, when legal and financial counselling services
are approached for bankruptcy advice, it often appears that the debt may not be enforceable or that

liability may not exist: see E. Swart & J. Lawton, "Voluntary Bankruptcy-The Ultimate Consumer
Protection" (1992) 66 L. Inst. J. 62.
65 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 54A
66 Ibid. s. 54D. See also Regulation 4.11 of the Bankruptcy Regulations, online: Australasian

Legal Information Institute, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/aullegis/cthlconsol-regIbr251/> (date
accessed: 9 July 1999) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Regulations].
67

See BanknptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 55(3A)

68 "A Finance Industry Perspective," supra note 4 at 17.
69 These include Credit Line in New South Wales, and the Financial and Consumer Rights
Council in Victoria.
70 See F.H. Buckley & M.F. Brinig, "The Bankruptcy Puzzle" (1998) 27 J. Legal Stud. 187 at
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The bankrupt's household property.7 1
Property used by the bankrupt in earning income by personal
exertion up to approximately A$2,600,72 or as increased by
creditors or the court.
Property used by the bankrupt primarily as a means of transport

up to a maximum of approximately A$5,000, or such greater
5.

6.

7.

amount as approved by creditors.
Prescribed interests in life assurance or endowment assurance, as
Well as in regulated superannuation funds or approved deposit
funds. 73
Prescribed rights of the bankrupt to recover, as well as actual
recoveries of damages or compensation for personal injuries, and
property purchased with such protected money. 74
Amounts paid to the bankrupt by way of loan as assistance for
the purpose of rehabilitation, household, or re-establishment

support under various state and federal rural support statutes.
Unlike North American jurisdictions, the Australian Act does
not contain interstate differences. 75

71 This means household property of a kind prescribed by the regulations or exempted by
creditors' resolution. Regulation 6.03(2) of the Bankruptcy Regulations, supra note 66, states that
divisible property does not extend to household property (including recreational and sports
equipment) that is reasonably necessary for the domestic use of the bankrupt's household, having
regard to current social standards. As well as listing certain items in Regulation 6.03(3), Regulation
6.03(4) describes criteria that must be considered by the trustee: the number and ages of members
of the bankrupt's household, as well as their special health or medical needs, if any; any special
climatic or other factors (including geographical isolation) of the place where the residence is
located; whether the property is reasonably necessary for the functioning or servicing of the
household as a viable and properly run household; and, finally, whether the costs of seizure, storage,
and sale of the property would be likely to exceed the sale price of the property, or whether, for any
other reason (eg., costs of transport), the sale of the property would likely be uneconomical.
72 The maximum amounts permitted in the regulations for income-producing property and
means of transport are indexed in accordance with the Consumer Price Index rate.
73 The effect of changes to the superannuation provisions is that approximately A$870,000 of
the bankrupt's superannuation assets is not divisible among creditors: see A. Yeo, "Protection of
Superannuation Assets: Potential Problems for Bankruptcy Trustees?" (1996) 4:4 lnsolv. L.J. 191.
74 These include rights for personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt, the spouse of the
bankrupt, or a member of the family of the bankrupt; and rights in respect of the death of the
spouse of the bankrupt, or a member of the family of the bankrupt.
75 See J.S. Ziegel, "Canadian Perspectives on the Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies"
(1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 199; and Buckley & Brinig, supra note 70.
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D. Dischaige-FreshStart
Among the principles identified by the Law Reform Commission
to guide the development of a modern insolvency law for Australia was
one that stated that "[t]he end result of an insolvency administration,
particularly as it affects individuals, should, with very limited exceptions,
be the effective relief or release from the financial liabilities and
obligations of the insolvent." 76 Thus, a bankrupt gains automatic
discharge from bankruptcy three years from the date on which he or she
files a Statement of Affairs, unless an objection to the discharge is
lodged.77 In certain circumstances, a bankrupt may also be able to apply
for an early discharge six months after that filing date. 78
Once a debtor becomes bankrupt, creditors who have provable
debts or claims 79 against the bankrupt lose their right to pursue the
bankrupt to recover such debts or claims 80 and, instead, obtain a right to
prove debts with other creditors in the distribution of the estate (i.e., the
bankrupt's divisible property). 8 ' The significance of the discharge is that
it releases the bankrupt from all, provable debts, and provides the
opportunity for a fresh start.
Another factor that may give debtors pause to think about the
ramifications of going bankrupt is how long the debtor retains the status
of an undischarged bankrupt and the limitations that this may impose.
For example, a bankrupt is required to assist the trustee in administering
the estate,8 2 to notify the trustee of any change of name or address,83

76 GeneralInsolvency Inquiry, supra note 11 at para. 33.
77

See Bankruptcy Act, supra note 7, s. 149.

78

biL s. 149S. Under section 149T of the Bankruptcy Act an early discharge is only available
where (1) there is insufficient money available to pay the remuneration or expenses of the trustee in

full, or there is no money to pay a dividend to creditors; (2) either the bankrupt has not entered into
a transaction void against the trustee or, if he or she has done so and the trustee were to take action,
no dividend would be paid to creditors; and (3) the income likely to be earned by the bankrupt in
the year following the application will not be sufficient to require an income contribution by the
bankrupt. Under sections 149X-149ZE of the Act the bankrupt may be disqualified from early
discharge where, for example, he or she has been bankrupted or entered into an arrangement with
creditors within the past ten years, whether within Australia or a foreign country.
79 Ibid. s. 82.
80 Ibid. s. 58(3).
81 Ibid. s. 108.

82 Ibid. s.77.
83 Ibid. s. 80.
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and to surrender his or her passport to the trustee.8 4 While they are
bankrupt, bankrupts must disclose their status in applying for credit of
A$3,419 or more.85
Another potential disincentive for a debtor declaring bankruptcy
is the possibility of not only forfeiting after-acquired property, but also
making compulsory income contributions to the divisible estate. In 1991,
Division 4B86 was introduced into Part VI of the Bankruptcy Act because
of the inadequacies of section 131.87 Now a trustee may assess a
bankrupt's income for a twelve-month "contribution assessment"
period 88 and, if the income exceeds the "actual income threshold
amount" applicable to the bankrupt, 89 he or she is liable to pay to the
trustee a contribution to his or her estate. 90 The amount to be paid is
calculated by deducting the actual income threshold amount from the
assessed income, and dividing that amount by two. The definition of
income under section 139L is very broad, 91 and may include the value of
benefits provided to a bankrupt in other than an employment context
(e.g., gifts and expense payments), and "loans" by associated entities.
The bankrupt is required to provide information about income to the
trustee and the trustee has powers to claim additional information where
he or she suspects false or misleading material has been provided.92 The
decision to assess a bankrupt may be reviewed by the InspectorGeneral.93

84

Ibid. s. 77(a)(2).

85 Ibid. s. 269. For the latest indexed figures, see online: Insolvency and Trustee Service
Australia <http://law.gov.au/itsa/frame curr.html> (date accessed: 5 September 1999). While it is
unlikely to affect non-business bankrupts, they must not manage a corporation without the leave of
the court (see Corporations Law, supra note 8, s. 229) or act as principals of businesses in certain
professional areas, such as solicitors or real estate agents.
86 See BankruptcyAmendmentAct, 1991 (Cth), s. 25.
87 Section 131 was repealed by section 24 ibid. It provided that a bankrupt was able to retain
income for his or her benefit, subject to any court order to the contrary.
88 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, s. 139K.
89 This is linked to the base income threshold amount, which is increased by percentages
depending upon the number of dependants supported by the bankrupt: ibid.
90Ibid.s. 139P.
91 It was amended by the Bankruptcy LegislationAmendment Act, 1996 (Cth) after the decision
in Bond, supranote 2.
92 See BankruptcyAct, supra note 7, ss. 139U-139V
93

Ibid. s. 139ZA. The decision may also be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal:
ibid. s. 139ZF.
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The bankrupt must pay the income contribution at a time
specified by the trustee, although payments may be permitted by
instalments. 94 The trustee may recover as a debt due to the estate any
contribution not so paid. 95 The Official Receiver, on his or her own
motion or at the request of a registered trustee, may also collect the
contribution from persons other than the bankrupt (e.g., someone
holding money for, or on account of, the bankrupt). 96
Where a bankrupt is liable to pay a contribution, he or she is not
permitted to leave Australia without the court's consent. 97 Also, a
bankrupt is disqualified from applying for an early discharge where the
income to be derived during the period of one year from the application
will exceed the actual income threshold amount.98 Introduction of the
income contribution scheme has meant that creditors are looking for
equivalent benefits in any Part X arrangements proposed by debtors to
avoid bankruptcy.
A bankruptcy may be extended where a trustee or an Official
Receiver lodges an objection to a bankrupt's automatic discharge. The
grounds of objection are intended "to encourage bankrupts to cooperate with the trustee and act with integrity." 99 They include matters
such as failure to disclose information about assets, liabilities, and/or
income, or engaging in misleading conduct after the date of bankruptcy
that involves amounts of more than $3,419.100
E. ConsumerCreditLegislation
The other side to the consumer bankruptcy issue is, arguably, the
role of consumer credit. In Australia, the regulation of consumer credit
falls within the states' jurisdiction. In 1994, a uniform national scheme
for consumer credit legislation, incorporating a Consumer Credit Code,

94 Ibid s. 139ZG..
95

Ibid.

96 Ibid. ss. 139ZK, 139ZL.
97

Ibid. s. 139ZU.

98

Ibid. s. 149T.

99 Keay, supra note 22 at 150.
100 See Bankruptcy Act, supra note 7, s. 149D. For the latest indexed figures, see online:

Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia <http://law.gov.au/itsa/framecurr.html> (date accessed:
5 September 1999).
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was introduced.1 01 The Code applies to credit contracts where the
debtor is a natural person; the credit is provided wholly or
predominantly for personal, domestic, or household purposes; a charge
is made for the credit; and the credit is provided in the course of a
business.1 02 The relevance of the Code for consumer bankruptcy is that
it is "based on the principle of truth-in-lending ... to allow borrowers to
make informed choices when purchasing credit." 103 Thus, the disclosure
requirements imposed on credit providers under the Code prior to, at
the time of, and during, the credit contract is intended to minimize poor
credit decisions by consumers.1 04
The Consumer Credit Code also makes it possible for a debtor
to seek variation of contractual terms during temporary financial
difficulties. Under section 66(1) of the Code, a debtor who is unable to
meet his or her obligations under a credit contract, because of illness,
unemployment, or other reasonable cause, and who reasonably expects
to be able to discharge them if the terms of the contract were
changed,105 may apply to a credit provider to change the contract. If the
credit provider refuses to agree, the debtor may apply to the court to
vary the credit contract. 106
A debtor may also apply to the court to reopen and review unjust
contractual provisions.1 07 If a credit provider fails to take into account a
consumer's ability to repay at the time of entering the credit contract,
the court may determine the contract to be unjust, and may reopen the
transaction. Section 70(2) of the Consumer Credit Code provides:
In determining whether a term of a particular credit contract, mortgage or guarantee is
unjust in the circumstances relating to it at the time it was entered into or changed, the
Court is to have regard to the public interest and to all the circumstances of the case and
may have regard to the following-

101 See Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act, 1994 (Qld), Appendix 36 ("Consumer Credit
Code") [references to Appendix 36 of this Act will hereinafter be referred to as the "Consumer
Credit Code"]; see also R. McDougall, Q.C., "An Introduction to the Consumer Credit Code"
(1996) 15 Austl. Bar Rev. 4.
102 See Consumer Credit Code, supranote 101, s. 6(1).
103 ConsumerCredit (Queensland)Bill, 1994 (Qld.), "Explanatory Notes" at 1.
104 See Consumer Credit Code, supranote 101, ss. 14-18.

105 The kinds of changes permitted by the Code include extending the contract and lessening
payments, and postponing the payment dates.
106 See Consumer Credit Code, supranote 101, s. 68.
107 Ibid. s. 70.
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(1)
whether at the time the contract, mortgage or guarantee was entered into or changed,
the credit provider knew, or could have ascertained by reasonable inquiry of the debtor at
the time, that the debtor could not pay in accordance with its terms or not without
substantial hardship ... 108

The AFC has argued that these provisions should reduce the need
for consumers to go bankrupt.109 If the cooling-off period available for

voluntary bankruptcies was extended from seven to twenty-eight days,
these provisions could arguably be used more effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even as long ago as 1604, the British Parliament recognized a
public policy dimension to insolvency which takes it beyond the mere
resolution of competing debtor and creditors' interests. The preamble to
the statute began with these words: "For that Fraudes and Deceipts as
new Diseases daylie increase amongst such as live by buyinge and
sellinge, to the hinderance of Traffique and mutuall Commerce, and to
the general Hurte of the Realme, by such as wickedly and wilfullie become
Bankrupts ... ."110

Insolvency means that a debtor has failed to meet his or her
financial obligations, and bankruptcy law seeks to promote commercial
morality.111 This is evident in the voidable antecedent transaction
provisions, 112 and in debtor misbehaviour comprising criminal
offences.1 13

However, the public interest may also be served by looking to
ways to decrease the number of bankruptcies, particularly consumer
bankruptcies. Potential responses mentioned in this paper have been to
make better use of the Consumer Credit Code remedies, to extend the

108 Ibid. s. 70(2). See also P. Bingham & R. Low, "Re-opening Unjust Contracts" (1996) 70:6
L. Inst. J. 42.
109 See "A Finance Industry Perspective," supra note 4 at 17.
11OAn Actefor the betterReliefe of the Creditorsagainstesuche as shall become Bankrupts, 1604
(U.K.), 1 Jac. I, c. 15, s. 1 [emphasis addedi.
111 It also seeks to encourage honest trading and to lessen the number of failures: see U.K.,
Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982) at para. 49.
112 An example of a voidable antecedent transaction provision is one that claws back into the
divisible property amounts fraudulently conveyed away.
113 Materially contributing to the insolvency through gambling is one example of such
misbehaviour.
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cooling-off period for those intending to petition voluntarily, and to
encourage greater use of debt agreements.
It must surely be "to the general Hurte of the Realme" for a
society to have so many individuals with the status of "bankrupt," and to
have so many credit providers dealing with debtor default, of which
apparently there is often no advance warning.') 4 Thus, scholarship that
promotes a comparative perspective on the multi-faceted issues
associated with consumer bankruptcy is to be applauded for the sake of
the various "Realmes" involved.

114

See Kumar, Mason & Ralston, supranote 5.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 1
BANKRUPTCY RATES
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FIGURE 2
BANKRUPTCY RATES AND CONSUMER CREDIT
(PERSONAL LOANS)
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